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CRVMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL 520.30: New York Supreme Court holds that defendant has
the burden of proving that collateral posted to indemnify a bail
bond obligor is not the fruit of criminal or unlawful activity
When a criminal defendant first "comes under the control of a
court," the court must, under New York law, release him on his
own recognizance, remand him to custody, or fix bail.' If bail has
been granted and posted, the court may, upon application of the
prosecutor, conduct a hearing to examine the "sufficiency" of the
cash or bond posted as bail.2 As a result of these hearings, courts
have rejected bail bonds when the capital used to indemnify the
1 CPL § 510.10 (McKinney 1984). Defendants may apply for bail at any time,
even after being remanded to custody. Id. § 510.20.1. In certain situations, the hear-
ing judge has substantial discretion in determining whether, and in what amount, to
grant bail. Id. § 510.30. The court must consider, however, factors such as the defend-
antfs criminal record, employment history, and community ties in the determination
of bail amounts. Id. § 510.30.2(a).
2 Id. § 520.30. That section provides:
1. Following the posting of a bail bond and the justifying affidavit or
affidavits or the posting of cash bail, the court may conduct an inquiry for
the purpose of determining the reliability of the obligors or person posting
cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered, and whether any
feature of the undertaking contravenes public policy; provided that before
undertaking an inquiry, of a person posting cash bail the court, after appli-
cation of the district attorney, must have had reasonable cause to believe
that the person posting cash bail is not in rightful possession of money
posted as cash bail or that such money constitutes the fruits of criminal or
unlawful conduct. The court may inquire into any matter stated or required
to be stated in the justifying affidavits, and may also inquire into other mat-
ters appropriate to the determination, which include but are not limited to
the following: (a) The background, character and reputation of any obligor,
and, in the case of an insurance company bail bond, the qualifications of the
surety-obligor and its executing agent; and (b) The source of any money or
property deposited by any obligor as security, and whether any such money
or property constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and (c)
The source of any money or property delivered or agreed to be delivered to
any obligor as indemnification on the bond, and whether any such money or
property constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and (d) The
background, character and reputation of any person who has indemnified or
agreed to indemnify an obligor upon the bond; and whether any such indem-
nitor, not being licensed by the superintendent of insurance in accordance
with the insurance law, has within a period of one month prior to such in-
demnity transaction given indemnification or security for like purpose in
more than two cases not arising out of the same transaction; and (e) The
source of any money posted as cash bail, and whether any such money con-
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bond company is determined to be "the fruit[ I of criminal or un-
lawful conduct."' Bail arrangements have been disallowed when,
for example, a defendant used $35,000 in cash which was previ-
ously rejected by the court as being suspicious in origin to secure a
bail bond,4 or when a pastor, in violation of his corporate powers,
pledged $100,000 of church funds to secure a bond for the release
of a parishioner.5 Recently, in People v. Esquivel,6 the Supreme
Court, New York County rejected a bail bond supported by collat-
eral of unquestionably lawful origins,7 based on its suspicions
about the motivation of the indemnitors in offering their assets as
collateral." In doing so, the court ruled that the defendant has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
collateral posted to indemnify a bail bond obligor 9 is not the fruit
of criminal or unlawful conduct.10 In addition, the court held that
it is authorized to disapprove the bail bond if it finds that any as-
pect of the transaction, including provisions for indemnification of
the obligor in case of forfeiture,11 contravenes public policy.12
stitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and (f) The background,
character and reputation of the person posting cash bail.
2. Upon such inquiry, the court may examine, under oath or otherwise,
the obligors and any other persons who may possess material information.
The district attorney has a right to attend such inquiry, to call witnesses and
to examine any witness in the proceeding. The court may, upon application
of the district attorney, adjourn the proceeding for a reasonable period to
allow him to investigate the matter.
3. At the conclusion of the inquiry, the court must issue an order either
approving or disapproving the bail.
Id.
3 Id.
4 Johnson v. Crane, 171 A.D.2d 537, 539, 568 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1st Dep't 1991).
5 In re CPL § 520.30 Inquiry, 78 Misc. 2d 244, 356 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1974).
6 158 Misc. 2d 720, 601 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
7 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 731, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
8 Id. at 731, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
9 See CPL § 500.10.11 (McKinney 1984). "'Obligor' means a person who executes
a bail bond on behalf of a principal and thereby assumes the undertaking described
therein." Id. A "principal" is a defendant or other party who may be compelled to
appear before the court to enable the exercise ofjurisdiction in a criminal proceeding.
Id. § 500.10.1.
10 See id. § 520.30.1.
11 Id. § 540.10.1. "If, without sufficient excuse, a principal does not appear when
required," bail is forfeited to the State. Id. In addition, if a criminal defendant who
has been released on bail fails to make a required appearance, he may be criminally
liable under bail jumping statutes. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 215.55-.57 (McKinney 1984).
12 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 730, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
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The defendant, Leonardo Esquivel, was arrested and charged
with possession of two kilograms of cocaine that were recovered
along with $98,000 in cash, jewelry, and "various Colombian pass-
ports."'3 Bail was set at $125,000, and a bond in that amount was
subsequently posted by the surety, International Fidelity Insur-
ance Company, 14 in order to secure the defendant's release. 15 Ac-
cording to the terms of the bond, the surety was to be indemnified
in case of forfeiture by an interest in the Queens County home of
Domingo and Guillermina Rodriguez. 6
Justice Leslie Crocker Snyder exercised her discretionary au-
thority-7 to conduct a bail sufficiency hearing.-8 At the hearing,
Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez testified that the defendant was their real
estate agent and had called from jail to ask them to post bail.' 9
Justice Snyder found the Rodriguezes' decision to post their house
as collateral for a business acquaintance "unworthy of belief."20
Based on this skepticism, and some minor inconsistencies be-
tween the Rodriguezes' testimony and the defendant's statements
to police,2 ' the court categorized the testimony as "perjured"22 and
13 Id. at 721, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
14 Since the principal himself may be an obligor, CPL § 500.10.11 (McKinney
1984), the term "surety" in this context refers to any bail bond obligor who is not a
principal. Id. § 500.10.12.
15 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 722, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
16 Id.
17 See CPL § 520.30.1 (McKinney 1984). This section states that "[flollowing the
posting of a bail bond ... the court may conduct an inquiry" into "the value and
sufficiency of any security offered." Id. (emphasis added); supra note 2 (setting forth
CPL § 520.30).
18 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 721, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 723, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 543. According to the defendant's attorney, the
Rodriguezes claimed that they were merely doing "what they hoped someone else
would do for their son if he were in trouble." Telephone Interview with Noah Lipman,
Esq., Attorney for the defendant (Sept. 1993). Nevertheless, the court found an insuf-
ficient personal relationship between the defendant and the indemnitors to justify the
pledging of their home. Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 723, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43.
21 Id. at 723, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 542. For example, Mrs. Rodriguez testified that
Esquivel had given her his home address in October 1990; however, according to the
police, the defendant did not reside there until July of 1991, nine months later. Simi-
larly, the Rodriguezes testified that they visited Esquivel at his office eight months
before the time he told police that he began working there. Id. Although Justice Sny-
der ruled that contradictions such as these indicated that the witnesses had commit-
ted perjury, it is submitted that this is clearly not the only inference that can be taken
from these inconsistencies. For instance, the witnesses might have confused the exact
dates, or might have been hampered by limited English language skills. The defend-
ant might have misstated this information to the Rodriguezes, or lied to the police
when arrested. The dates might have been misrecorded on the police report. In any
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concluded that "either some unknown arrangement exists be-
tween the Rodriguez family and the defendant or that the defend-
ant induced the family to post their home as collateral through
threats or bribes."23 On these grounds, Justice Snyder invalidated
the posting of the bail bond as against public policy.
In order to reject the posted bail bond without any actual
proof of impropriety, it was necessary for Justice Snyder to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant.24 Her rationale for doing so
was based on the proposition that the function of bail is to secure a
defendant's appearance in court.25 Drug defendants, the court as-
serted, may have "vast amounts" of illegal resources of which the
court has no knowledge when determining appropriate bail
amounts, and if the posted funds are the fruit of criminal or un-
lawful conduct, a defendant may choose to forfeit the collateral
event, the mere existence of these inconsistencies is far from convincing evidence that
the witnesses were committing perjury.
22 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 731, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 548. The court's finding raises
substantial questions. If the Rodriguezes were found to be "perjurers," would this be
an official determination of criminal culpability? See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 210.05-.15
(McKinney 1984). Since this clearly was not the court's intention, its "finding"
amounted simply to a perception of the witnesses' credibility. It is submitted that the
mere perception of "indicia of coercion," 158 Misc. 2d at 731, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547, is
too slight a basis for deeming the entire bail arrangement "unlawful" or against public
policy, without supporting evidence. Indeed, in People v. Rosario, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5,
1994, at 23 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994), the court accepted $7500 cash bail from an
individual who was unacquainted with the defendant and gave false information to
the police about his criminal record and the source of the money. The witness, Ernesto
Gonzalez, bought some property in the Dominican Republic, offered by the defend-
ant's family for the purpose of raising bail, and arranged, at their request, to post the
purchase money directly with the court. Gonzalez lied about his criminal record and
the source of the cash and had been living well beyond the means indicated by his
reported income. The court found this evidence insufficient to reject bail under
§ 520.30, stating that the prosecution's case was based on "highly speculative conclu-
sions of [Gonzalez's] ... wrongful possession of the bail funds." Id. at 23. Because the
connection between the indemnitors and the defendant is stronger in Esquivel than in
Rosario, and because the situation in Esquivel is arguably less suspicious, it is sub-
mitted that the conclusions of impropriety made by the court in Esquivel are at least
as speculative.
23 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 724, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
24 The question of the burden of proof was one of first impression in this case. Id.
at 721, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 541. The only statutory indication of a burden of persuasion
requires the prosecutor to provide the court with "reasonable cause to believe.., that
such money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct" as a condition pre-
cedent to convention of a bail sufficiency hearing. CPL § 520.30.1 (McKinney 1984).
The court failed to state whether this statutory burden was met in Esquivel. See infra
notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable cause requirement in con-
text of bail bonds).
25 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 727, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
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and flee.26 Additionally, defendants are "uniquely suited to know
the source of the bail funds";2 7 thus, despite contrary language in
the statute, the court posited that the prosecution should be
spared the burden of lengthy investigations which could extend
pretrial detention periods.28 Justice Snyder concluded that the
practice of placing the burden of persuasion on a criminal defend-
ant "in contexts collateral to the question of guilt is well estab-
lished under New York law."29
It is submitted that there are significant problems with the
court's rationale. First, the "hidden resources" rationale relates
only to the sufficiency of bail amounts, which was not an issue
before the Esquivel court;30 therefore, Justice Snyder's reliance
on this argument in determining that the Rodriguez home was im-
properly pledged was inappropriate. In addition, the court mis-
takenly assumed that placing the burden of proof on the defend-
ant, rather than on the State, would provide additional assurance
that the defendant does not possess hidden resources. It is possi-
ble, however, that shifting the burden, and thus relieving the
prosecution of the need to investigate a defendant's finances, could
actually enhance a defendant's ability to conceal illicit resources.
Further, the argument that a defendant is "uniquely suited"
to know whether he has engaged in criminal or unlawful activity
may be jurisprudentially inadequate in the criminal context.
When the alleged conduct is criminal in nature, such burden shift-
ing creates a de facto presumption of culpability that the defend-
26 Id.
27 Id. at 728; 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
28 Id. According to the court, to require a defendant who submits bail fimds ac-
quired from legitimate sources to remain incarcerated while the People conduct a
lengthy investigation would be unfair. Id. at 728, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46. Because
the defense must routinely provide detailed information regarding the source of bail
fuids, id., an inquiry by the prosecutor arguably would not impose significant addi-
tional burdens. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing burden of proof
allocation). Moreover, the statute specifically contemplates an investigation by the
People: it allows the court, "upon application of the district attorney, [to] adjourn the
proceeding for a reasonable period to allow him to investigate the matter." CPL
§ 520.30.2 (McKinney 1984). In addition, relieving the prosecutor of any investigatory
burden would make asset-concealment by defendants more, not less, feasible.
29 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 728, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (citing People v. Rosa, 65
N.Y.2d 380, 387, 482 N.E.2d 21, 25, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542, 547 (1985)).
30 In a bail sufficiency inquiry under this statute, the court is empowered only to
"issue an order either approving or disapproving the bail." CPL § 520.30.3 (McKinney
1984). Therefore, the bail amount, which had been set prior to this hearing, was not
subject to revision here.
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ant would have to overcome in order to post bail.3 1 A defendant
who has lawfully arranged bail, but cannot meet the burden of
proof, would suffer the consequences of culpability even though, as
here, the prosecutor has not demonstrated his culpability to the
court.32
It is true, as Justice Snyder noted, that the burden in collat-
eral matters is often placed on a criminal defendant. 3 Thus, the
relevant question becomes whether the legality of the source of
the defendant's bail funds is truly collateral to the issue of guilt.
It is foreseeable that in many cases, especially those involving
cash bail posted by those accused of narcotics sales, larceny, or
extortion, defendants might effectively have to prove their inno-
cence in order to establish the legitimacy of their bail offerings.34
To do so, such defendants will have to meet a higher standard in a
pretrial hearing, because of this burden shifting, than they will
face at trial.3 Although placing the burden of proof for certain
issues on the defendant is accepted in criminal jurisprudence, the
cases supporting such burden shifting under New York law all in-
volve matters less related to the question of criminal culpability
than those involved in Esquivel.36
31 The effect of such a de facto presumption can be seen in Esquivel. The court
ruled that because the circumstances "suggest" that the defendant is "capable of cor-
rupting the indemnitors and has a compelling motive to do so," it "must conclude" that
he has done so. 158 Misc. 2d at 723-24, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (emphasis added). It
would appear that without the benefit of such a presumption, capacity and motive
would have to be accompanied by some evidence of commission to result in a finding of
culpability.
32 In actions to determine criminal culpability, defendants are guaranteed a pre-
sumption of innocence under New York law, CPL § 300.10.2 (McKinney 1984), and by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See People v. Sickles, 156 N.Y.
541, 547, 51 N.E. 288, 290 (1898). The fact that a defendant is uniquely suited to
know whether he has committed the substantive crime charged is clearly insufficient
justification for shifting the burden of proof on guilt or innocence.
33 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.00 (MeKinney 1984). For example, criminal defendants in
New York have the burden of proving any affirmative defenses, such as duress, id., or
entrapment, id. § 40.05, by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 25.00.2.
34 For example, a defendant accused of selling drugs could have to prove that the
resources at his disposal for bail were not acquired by selling drugs.
35 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 25.00 (McKinney 1987). At trial, it is the People who
have the burden of disproving any defense, other than affirmative defenses, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
36 See, e.g., People v. Rosa, 65 N.Y.2d 380, 482 N.E.2d 21, 492 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1985). In Rosa, the New York Court of Appeals held that when a defendant moves to
suppress a statement made to police outside the presence of counsel on the grounds
that he was represented on a pending charge of which the police had knowledge, he
has the burden of proving such prior representation. Id. at 386, 482 N.E.2d 21, 26, 492
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Defendants should not be free to use criminal proceeds to sat-
isfy bail requirements. Nevertheless, it would be more consistent
with traditional notions of defendants' rights, especially where
criminal conduct is alleged for the prosecution to have the burden
of showing that bail funds were illegally obtained.3 7
The other holding in Esquivel, that the court may reject a bail
offering based on a finding of impropriety in a tertiary indemnifi-
cation arrangement, 38 raises questions about the scope and appli-
cation of section 520.30 of the CPL. The CPL requires that the
court to have "reasonable cause to believe that the person posting
cash bail is not in rightful possession of money posted as cash bail
or that such money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful
conduct" in order to convene a sufficiency hearing, "after applica-
tion of the district attorney."39 Although the CPL is unclear as to
whether this reasonable cause requirement applies where bail has
been posted in bond form, there is significant authority to suggest
N.Y.S.2d at 546. In People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367, 270 N.E.2d 709, 712, 321
N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (1971), the court held that a defendant who challenges the admissi-
bility of physical evidence has the burden of proving that the evidence should not be
admitted. Id. at 367, 270 N.E.2d at 712, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (citations omitted).
Although the evidence, once admitted, may weigh heavily on the issue of culpability,
the question of admissibility itself is arguably less related to culpability for illegal
acts than whether a defendant has arranged bail unlawfully.
The defendant may also have the burden of proving certain affumative defenses
in New York, as long as the prosecution is not thereby relieved of proving any element
of the alleged crime. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211-12 (1977). See, e.g.,
People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976) (extreme
emotional disturbance defense); People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 532
N.Y.S.2d 45 (1988) (insanity defense); People v. Donovan, 53 A.D.2d 27, 385 N.Y.S.2d
385 (3d Dep't 1976) (requiring defendant to prove he did not commit, solicit, or aid in
commission of felony murder).
37 The prosecution traditionally bears the burden of proof when criminal conduct
is alleged. See supra note 35. In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has sug-
gested that "it is most reasonable to require [the party asserting a claim] to bear the
burden of proof of that wrong." Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d at 367, 270 N.E.2d at 713, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 888. Section 520.30 requires that the hearing be initiated by the prosecu-
tor. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Thus, it appears logical to place that
burden on the prosecution.
The Esquivel court suggests, however, that assigning the burden of proof to de-
fendants actually protects their rights, by shielding them from lengthy prosecutorial
investigations while they await bail. 158 Misc. 2d at 728, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46.
This contradicts the court's stated purpose of uncovering "hidden resources," see
supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text, because those resources will hardly come
to light in the absence of prosecutorial investigations.
38 Esquivel, 158 Misc.2d at 731, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
39 CPL § 520.30.1 (McKinney 1984) (emphasis added).
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that it does.40 Nevertheless, after confirming that this standard
applies,4 1 the court failed to determine whether the standard was
40 In his official practice commentary on this section, Judge Bellacosa indicated
that reasonable cause must always be demonstrated in order to convene a § 520.30
hearing. CPL 520.30 commentary at 57 (McKinney 1984); see also Abraham Abramov-
sky, Bail Source Hearings, N.Y. L.J., July 29, 1992, at 3 ("Absent this reasonable
cause, the court cannot conduct a sufficiency hearing and cannot sua sponte order the
defendant detained until a hearing has been conducted.").
41 Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 725-26, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 544. The difference in treat-
ment of cash and bail bonds under the statute may be a result of historical differences
between these forms of bail. See id.; see also People v. Sherman, 132 Misc. 2d 15, 15-
16, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 914, 915 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (describing various types of
bail bonds). At common law, cash bail was not recognized; it is a purely statutory
creation. Badolato v. Molinari, 106 Misc. 342,345, 174 N.Y.S. 512,514 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1919). The purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial.
People v. Dizdar, 91 Misc. 2d 23, 25, 397 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1977). Historically, the securing function of a bail bond was satisfied by the surety's
personal obligation to deliver the principal to the court when required. Id.; Badolato,
106 Misc. at 345-46, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (citation omitted). With cash bail, however,
it is the threat of forfeiture, not the obligation of the surety, that is relied upon to
ensure the principal's appearance. People v. Castro, 119 Misc. 2d 787, 793, 464
N.Y.S.2d 650, 655-56 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983) (citing Moloney v. Nelson, 158
N.Y. 351, 355, 53 N.E. 31, 32-33 (1899)). In 1984, however, the New York Legislature
amended the Criminal Procedure Law to eliminate many of the remaining differences
in the legal treatment of cash and bail bonds. See Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 725, 601
N.Y.S.2d at 544. For example, those who post cash bail must now undertake to en-
sure the principal's presence when the principal is required in court. CPL
§ 520.15(2)(e) (McKinney 1984).
Justice Snyder rationalized the apparent distinction between cash bail and bail
bonds in the language of § 520.30 in terms of the State's interests in these two types
of securites. 158 Misc. 2d at 726, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 544. Since the State is already in
possession of the collateral when cash bail is posted, it is substantially protected
against the defendant's flight by the risk of forfeiture, id., and thus reasonable cause
should be required to prompt an examination of the source of cash bail. With bail
bonds, on the other hand, courts historically needed more discretion to question the
sufficiency of bail since, if the obligor was unreliable, the State would not be ade-
quately protected against the defendant's flight. See id.
Justice Snyder correctly stated, however, that "it makes no logical sense for a
court to distinguish between cash bail and bail bonds in deciding whether to order an
examination of surety where it appears that the collateral may be the fruit of unlaw-
ful conduct." Id. (emphasis added). Apparently, this means that if the surety is relia-
ble (and there was no question that International Fidelity was unreliable), then the
State is equally guaranteed its forfeiture if the defendant flees. Thus, as with cash
bail, an inquiry into the underlying collateral should be undertaken only when rea-
sonable cause exists. This position is supported by the official practice commentary to
§ 520.30. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The commentary suggests that
reasonable cause may be required whenever a bail sufficiency hearing is requested.
Id.; see Abramovsky, supra note 40. However, there is no discussion in the Esquivel
opinion of whether this reasonable cause requirement was met before the hearing was
convened.
If the distinctions between cash bail and bail bonds were meant to be diminished
or extinguished under New York law, it is arguable that the limits of a sufficiency
304
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satisfied under the facts of Esquivel. In addition, despite the stat-
utory requirement that the prosecutor initiate the hearing appli-
cation,4 2 the court indicated it had authority to do so sua sponte.43
Thus, the very decision to convene the hearing in this case may
have been beyond the scope of section 520.30.
Esquivel is the first case to extend the "public policy" provi-
sion of section 520.30" to a tertiary agreement between a princi-
pal and an indemnitor on a bail bond, under circumstances in
which there was no actual proof of unlawfulness. 45 In fact, an-
inquiry may be determined by the state's interest in guaranteeing that bail Will be
forfeited if the principal does not appear. In Barnes v. Cohen, 45 A.D.2d 837, 358
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1974), the court stated that "if a qualified company is willing to
write a bond, then the requirements are fulfilled for the purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the defendant at the trial." Id. at 838, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
The court also stated, however, that "CPL § 520.30 ... is directed primarily toward
the obligor... rather than the underlying indemnification, except to the extent of any
public policy question." Id. The Esquivel court described the issue there in terms of
public policy ramifications. 158 Misc. 2d at 729-30, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47.
42 See supra note 2 (setting forth CPL § 520.30); see also In re CPL § 520.30 In-
quiry, 78 Misc. 2d 244,245,356 N.Y.S.2d 749,750 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1974) ("The
District Attorney, pursuant to § 520.30 ... questioned the sufficiency of the collateral
and asked that the indemnitor... justify such security."); Abranovsky, supra note 40
(stating that courts cannot initiate bail sufficiency hearings sua sponte).
43 See Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 726, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45. The court stated
that "[i]f the court or the People have a rational basis for inquiring into the reliability
of the obligors or the source of the collateral posted .... a surety hearing should be
ordered by the court." Id. (emphasis added).
44 CPL § 520.30 (McKinney 1984). This section provides, in pertinent part, that
"the court may conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining the reliability of the
obligors or person posting cash bail, the value and sufficiency of any security offered,
and whether any feature of the undertaking contravenes public policy." Id. (emphasis
added). Since the reliability of the obligor and the sufficiency of the posted bond itself
were not questioned in this case, see supra note 40, it is this last clause on which
Justice Snyder relied for the authority to question the sufficiency of bail here. Es-
quivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 729-30, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 546-47.
45 In Johnson v. Crane, 171 A.D.2d 537, 568 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1991), the
court interpreted § 520.30 as granting "substantial discretion" to inquire into the
source of collateral pledged as security on a bail bond. Id. at 538, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
In Crane, however, the court found that the $35,000 pledged as security by the de-
fendant's grandmother was the same money previously offered as cash bail and re-
jected because of its suspicious origin. Id. at 538-39, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 23. This "facile
manipulation" of funds to support a bail bond was held to be within the scope of the
court's § 520.30 inquiry. Id. at 539, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 23. In In re CPL Inquiry, a bond
was rejected on public policy grounds when a minister, in violation of his corporate
powers, pledged $100,000 of church funds as indemnification on a bond to secure the
release of a church member. 78 isc.2d at 244, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Thus, the public
policy provision of § 520.30 has never been used to reject a posted bail bond based on
an indemnification arrangement that was not clearly unlawful. Also, it is arguable
that when the State is protected by the obligor's reliability, examination of the under-
lying indemnification arrangement is outside the court's purview, see supra note 41,
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other recent supreme court decision held that bail posted in prac-
tically analogous circumstances was acceptable.46 Furthermore,
the court's inquiry extended beyond the enunciated scope of the
CPL because there was no allegation that the Rodriguez home it-
self represented the "fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct" or
that the couple had any background in, or reputation for, such
conduct.47
The combination of the two holdings in Esquivel enables
judges to disallow a bail bond posted by a reputable surety and
secured by a pledge of real property of unquestionable provenance,
without any actual proof of impropriety.4" This may create a de
facto pretrial burden on defendants to prove innocence on any col-
lateral charges involving the unlawful accumulation of capital.
Defendants who are unable to meet this standard would suffer the
consequences of the allegedly unlawful conduct, in the form of de-
nial of bail, whether they had acted unlawfully or not.
Furthermore, Justice Snyder's decision in this case expands
the scope of CPL section 520.30 beyond any previous judicial ap-
especially when the arrangement is not explicitly shown to be illegal, as in In re CPL
Inquiry.
46 People v. Rosario, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5, 1994, at 23 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994).
In Rosario, the court held that a supplier of cash bail was "in rightful possession of the
money he posted," even though he had never met the defendant, and had been in-
duced to post bail in circumstances at least as tenuous as those in Esquivel. Id. at 24.
47 See supra note 2 (CPL § 520.30). Section 520.30 sets out six specific areas of
inquiry "appropriate to the determination" of bail sufficiency. Id. Two of these relate
to cash bail only, and thus are not applicable here. Id. Although these categories
clearly do not limit the scope of inquiry, they do provide clear guidelines. Because the
obligor's reliability, the background of the indemnitors, and the provenance of the
collateral were unquestioned in the instant case, there is no suggestion that the object
of inquiry in Esquivel falls within any of the four remaining categories.
48 The Appellate Division rejected Esquivel's appeal without comment or publica-
tion. Telephone Interview with Noah Lipman, Esq., Attorney for the defendant (Sept.
1993). It is axiomatic that no inferences on the merits of a case should be drawn from
a decision not to consider an appeal. However, the fact that this case had been sub-
stantively concluded by the time the appeal was considered should not in itself man-
date rejection. Although this particular controversy had become moot by that time,
these circumstances typify the classical exception to the mootness doctrine: the effect
of an improper bail ruling tends, by the nature of its brief duration, to evade review,
yet it is capable of repetition under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878,
431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1980); Adirondack League Club v. Board of Black River Regu-
lating Dist., 301 N.Y. 219, 222, 93 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1950) (stating that although im-
mediate circumstances do not warrant, state occasionally decides moot questions
which arise with frequency). In addition, the apparent conflict between the holdings
in Esquivel and Rosario, supra notes 22, 46, militates in favor of appellate review of
these issues.
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plication. It is possible that in creating this dramatic precedent,
the court was merely attempting to strike down a bail determina-
tion that the court deemed inadequate to ensure the defendant's
presence at trial.49 The result, however, established a precedent
for a presumption of unlawfulness that defendants must overcome
if bail arrangements are to be sustained under CPL section
520.30.
John C. Longmire
49 See Esquivel, 158 Misc. 2d at 731, 601 N.Y.S. 2d at 547 (indicating Court's fear
that defendant was a flight risk). In Johnson, 171 A.D.2d at 539, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 23,
the court stated that "the People have no appeal from an order setting bail." Id.; see
CPL § 450.20 (McKinney 1984). Thus, since the bail amount could not be altered in
this CPL 520.30 hearing, only the complete rejection of the posted bail could ensure
the defendant's continued detention.
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